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Abstract
In historical accounts of the world economic crisis of the 1930s, Switzerland is
known for its staunch defense of the gold standard and the rise of corporatist
policies. Yet, so far, the literature has not discussed the implications of these
two features. This paper tries to show how the combination of hard–currency
policy and nominal rigidities introduced by corporatist policies proved to be
fatal for growth. Estimating a New Keynesian small open economy model for
the period 1926–1938, we show that the decision to participate in the Gold
Bloc after 1933 at an overvalued currency can be identified as the main reason
for the unusual long lasting recession and that price rigidities from 1931 to
1936 significantly slowed down the adjustment process.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has shown that Switzerland’s dismal performance during the 1930s
was mainly due to its exchange rate policy (Bordo et al., 2007; Bordo and James,
2007). Thanks to a high gold cover ratio, the Swiss National Bank was able to defend
the old parity against any speculative attack, thus preventing an early devaluation
of the Swiss franc that would have restored the competitiveness of Switzerland’s
exporting sectors. This exchange rate policy was motivated by a variety of reasons,
yet the widespread gold standard mentality certainly played a key role. The strong
belief that a devaluation would lead to inflation and that the gold standard was the
only reliable guarantee for prosperity and stability, led economies to stay on gold
as long as possible – a decision which implied a lagged recovery from the Great
Depression (e.g. Balderston, 2003; Feinstein et al., 2008).1 As (Straumann, 2010, p.
129–142) shows, this was also the case for Switzerland. Only when the last major
trading partner, France (see Table 1), decided to devalue its currency, Switzerland
was ready to change course. In September 1936, the Swiss franc was devalued by
30 percent.
To demonstrate the consequence of Switzerland’s defense of the gold standard,
we adapt the famous “contracting spiral of world trade”–graph, first published by
the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research (O¨sterreichisches Institut fu¨r
Konjunkturforschung) in 1933 (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995), to Swiss exports (Fig-
ure 1). Real exports fell by 50 percent until June 1932, followed by a weak recovery
to about 60–70 percent of the October 1929 level. The consequence of the decision to
join the Gold Bloc in 1933 (together with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Poland) was that exports stayed at this level until end of 1936. Due to the
overvalued Swiss franc, the Swiss exporting sectors profited less from the recovery
of the world economy than small European countries with a devalued currency such
as the Scandinavian countries.
1“A further aspect of great significance was the widespread belief in financial and political circles
that it was essential to return to the pre–war gold standard if the growth and prosperity of the pre–
1914 era were to be re–established, whatever the sacrifices their countries would have to make in
oder to force down wages and prices so that the pre–war value of the currency could be restored.”
(Feinstein et al., 2008, p. 1)
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Figure 1: Swiss Exports, January 1929 – December 1936
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Notes: Real exports, October 1929=100; Source: Monatsstatistik des auswa¨rtigen Handels der
Schweiz, 1929–1932
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Table 1: Major Trading Partners of Switzerland in the Interwar Period
County Export Share Import Share
Germany 17.43% 27.25%
France 13.09% 16.15%
Italy 8.22% 7.62%
United Kingdom 12.19% 5.53%
United States 7.24% 6.57%
Total 58.18% 63.12%
Notes: Average country shares of total exports & imports during 1929–1936. Source:
Swiss Economic and Social History Online Database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat), Tables
L.18, L.19, L.22 ,L.23.
The Swiss National Bank’s defense of the old gold parity was particularly detri-
mental as Switzerland’s prices were extraordinarily sticky during this period. As a
matter of fact, regulations protecting individual economic sectors and fixing prices
dramatically increased during the crisis. Instead of enabling the downward ad-
justment, the government sought to cushion the negative effects of an overvalued
currency by containing competition. Almost any pressure group, in particular Swiss
farmers, was able to obtain protection and subsidies. In many historical accounts,
the rise of these corporatist policies in the 1930s has been hailed as the beginning of
a fruitful cooperation between capital and labor. But in the context of an orthodox
gold standard policy, these rigidities proved to be fatal. Therefore, understanding
the nature of Switzerland’s economic crisis during the 1930s requires not only a
thorough analysis of the exchange rate policy, but also a better grasp of how prices
adjusted before and after 1929.
Besides the exchange rate policy and the stickiness of prices, there is a third
feature defining the course of Switzerland’s economic crisis. The ample gold reserves
may have prevented the Swiss National Bank from leaving the gold standard at an
early state of the crisis. But on the other hand, they also allowed the central
bank to refrain from increasing interest rates in the face of speculative attacks.
From 1931 to 1936 when the devaluation enabled the central bank to reflate the
economy nominal interests remained close to zero. By contrast, Belgium and France,
which also defended the gold standard until the mid–1930s were forced to increase
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their interest rates whenever investors mistrusted their currencies. Thus, the usual
constraints of the gold standard did not apply until 1936 for the case of Switzerland.
In this paper, we try to account for these different aspects of the Swiss crisis.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide a new monthly dataset covering the
performance of the real economy from January 1926 to December 1938. Second, we
estimate the structural parameters of a New Keynesian small open economy model
for Switzerland in the spirit of Clarida et al. (2000, 2001) and Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005), going beyond the calibration exercise in Bordo et al. (2007). We explicitly
take into account the fact that Switzerland was not forced to increase nominal in-
terest rates during the Gold Bloc period due to the massive gold inflow starting
with the German crisis in June 1931 and intensifying after Britain went off gold.
Following Ireland (2004), the model incorporates a vector autoregressive measure-
ment error component capturing the dynamics in the data which are not represented
by the economic part. This feature allows to assess the model’s suitability for the
data under analysis. Moreover, it is possible to compare the relative importance
of the structural shocks (foreign demand shock and terms of trade shock) with the
contribution of the measurement error block by looking at the decomposition of the
forecast error variance. The results show that the economic part of the model con-
tributes a significant variance share. The structural approach enables us to embark
on a counterfactual experiment by simulating the Swiss economy in the case of a
devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1931, the month at which the UK left
gold.
Our results show that the terms of trade shock played an important role for the
Swiss economy during the Interwar Period. While foreign demand was recovering
after 1932, the terms of trade further deteriorated. Consequently, the latter effect
dominated the foreign demand impulse and led to a long lasting recession, which only
ended when Switzerland left gold in September 1936. As a result, our counterfactual
analysis implies that in case of an earlier devaluation of the Swiss franc, the economy
would have recovered a lot faster and reached its steady state level shortly after
leaving gold: the decision to defend the parity turned out to be extremely costly.
This finding is in line with the successful recovery of Sweden after leaving gold
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together with the UK (Rathke et al., 2011).
Our third contribution is that we provide a thorough discussion of how prices
behaved from 1926 to 1938. In particular, we detect severe price rigidities, induced
by a high degree of cartelization and regulatory measures, as an important char-
acteristic of the Swiss economy in the Interwar Period. Moreover, our estimation
results not only confirm this finding but also emphasize the cost of it. A counterfac-
tual analysis shows that a lower degree of price stickiness would have been beneficial
for the Swiss economy. This result highlights the potential benefits of an internal
devaluation and the cost of corporatist policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and
outlines the underlying model. In Section 3 we present the data and our estimation
strategy. Section 4 discussed the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The underlying model corresponds to the basic New Keynesian small open economy
model as introduced by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Gal´ı (2008). Already in the
Interwar years, the Swiss economy was characterized by a high degree of openness.2
Thus, we believe it is important to model open economy characteristics explicitly.
Moreover, we follow Calvo (1983) by modeling nominal price rigidities. This seems
to be an important stylized fact for the period under analysis: a large share of
domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. Not only did it own the
national monopoly for mail, telegram and telephone services and the Swiss federal
railway, but also began to stabilize agricultural prices in the midst of the depression
(Rutz, 1970, p. 180–184).
Price rigidities became an issue already in the 1920s, illustrated by the increasing
difference between wholesale and consumer prices after the recession of 1921/22
(Kaufmann 1952, Marbach 1952, p. 747; see upper part of Figure 4). Especially
the degree of cartelization of the Swiss economy was blamed for this development.3
2E.g. in 1928 exports accounted for 20 percent of GDP (Source: Die Volkswirtschaft, 1924–
1944).
3Commenting on the first results of the cartel enqueˆte of the Preisbildungskommission in 1937,
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Regional monthly prices for important consumption goods provide an impression of
price stickiness in the 1920s. The data on regional prices cover the period 1924–
1929.4 From 33 municipalities,5 the most frequent prices per month are reported for
15 consumption goods,6 which amounts to a total of 495 time series. Counting the
frequency of monthly price changes in these price series reveals a very low modus of
0.07, which is depicted in Figure 2.
The regional variation is not very high (25% quantile: 0.080; 50% quantile: 0.090;
75% quantile: 0.110; Figure 3), suggesting that price stickiness was a regionally wide
spread phenomenon. The cantons with a low degree of price stickiness as compared
to the rest are Zurich, St. Gall, Lucerne, Solothurn, and Ticino, ranging from the
alpine South to the industrialized North–West of Switzerland.
In order to address the issue, the ministry of economics (Eid. Volkswirtschafts-
departement, EVD) installed a new committee to study price formation (Preisbil-
dungskommission) in 1926, but without any control rights.7
A department for price controls (Preiskontrollstelle) was founded in 1931, in re-
Fritz Marbach, a member of the commission from 1931 to 1965 and president from 1939 on, stated
that free pricing was the exception rather than the rule (“[...] im allgemeinen darf man aber wohl
behaupten, dass der Kartellpreis und nicht der ‘freie Preis’ die Regel ist”; Marbach 1937, p. 34).
He repeats this assessment in his overview article on cartels in the 1955 edition of the Handbuch
der Schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft (“Der freie Preis ist in der schweizerischen Wirtschaft eine
Aussnahme.” Marbach, 1955, p. 19). The stability of cartelization in Switzerland can be explained
by the attitude of the public (see Katzenstein 1985, 2003 and the discussion in Straumann 2010,
p. 344–345 for the importance of democratic corporatism for European small open economies).
Illustrating this phenomenon, Marbach joked that the Swiss are in principle in favor of free markets,
under the condition that they are exempt (“Der Schweizer ist dem Prinzip des freien Wettbewerbes
(allerdings nimmt er sich dabei nur allzuleicht selber aus) im grossen und ganzen recht gewogen.”
Marbach, 1952, p. 754). For an overview of cartelization in Switzerland, see Eidgeno¨ssisches
Volkswirtschaftsdepartement (1957) and Schro¨ter (2011).
4For 1924 to 1927, they come from the Sozialstatistische Mitteilungen, edited by the Eidg.
Arbeitsamt. After 1927, the source is the Wirtschaftliche und sozialstatistische Mitteilungen, edited
by the Eidg. Volkswirtschaftsdepartement.
5Aarau, Arbon, Baden, Basle, Berne, Biel, La Chaux–de–Fonds, Chur, Frauenfeld, Fribourg,
Geneva, Glarus , Herisau, Langenthal, Lausanne, Liestal, Le Locle, Lugano, Luzern, Neuchaˆtel,
Olten, Porrentruy, Rorschach, St. Gall, St–Imier, St. Moritz, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, Sion,
Solothurn, Vevey, Winterthur, Zurich, Zug. We take these municipalities as representative for
the respective canton (Figure 3).
6Beef (Ochsenfleisch mit Knochen, zum Sieden), pork (frisches mageres Schweinefleisch mit
Knochen), veal (Kalbsfleisch, 1. Qualita¨t mit Knochen), fat (inla¨ndisches Schweineschmalz, frisches
Nierenfett), butter (Tafelbutter), cheese (Emmentaler–, Greyerzer– oder Appenzellerka¨se, 1.
Qualita¨t), milk (Vollmilch), bread (Vollbrot), flour (Weissmehl), pasta (offene Teigwaren, Mit-
telqualita¨t), sugar (Kristallzucker weiss), potatoes (neue inla¨ndische Kartoffeln), eggs (inla¨ndische
Trinkeier), coal (Braunkohlenbriketts, ins Haus geliefert).
7For the following, see Lautner (1950, p. 1–12), Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r Kriegswirtschaft
(1950, p. 877–887), and Marbach (1952).
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Figure 2: Price Stickiness, 1924–1929
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Notes: Gaussian kernel density estimator, bandwidth: (Pagan and Ullah, 1999, equation 2.50);
data sources: see text.
Figure 3: Regional Price Stickiness, 1924–1929
Notes: Frequency of monthly price changes; 33 municipalities, 15 prices (179 potential changes;
data sources: see text); 25% quantile: 0.080; 50% quantile: 0.090; 75% quantile: 0.110. There are
no prices available for Central Switzerland cantons such as Uri and Obwalden/Nidwalden, and
also for Appenzell Innerrhoden.
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Figure 4: Producer and Consumer Price Indices, 1926–1938
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Source: Swiss Economic and Social History Online Database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/), Table
H.1
sponse to the Great Depression. Its main purpose was to monitor the influence of
import restrictions on prices and to prevent unjustified price increases. In the begin-
ning, it lacked effectiveness, because it depended heavily on voluntary cooperation.
The lower part of Figure 4 illustrates this lack of effectiveness: wholesale prices kept
falling faster than consumer prices. As a consequence and in fear of inflationary
pressure due to the devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1936, the Swiss par-
liament decided to implement direct price controls in 1936. The Preiskontrollstelle
was authorized to collect necessary data and regulate prices. These regulations had
two purposes: to protect consumers against unjustified price increases, and also to
protect producers from price dumping. For example, milk prices were pegged by
compulsory cartels and quotas, and export of watches became only possible condi-
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tional to complying with the price regulations of the watch industry (Hug, 1938,
p. 364–366). Almost all prices were regulated (goods and services, gas, electricity,
rents), and from September 1936 on, could only be increased with official approval,
and even with approval, the adjustment had to be stepwise (Hug, 1938, p. 362).
The effectiveness of this regulatory intervention can be seen from the lower part of
Figure 4: while wholesale prices started to increase steeply after 1936, the increase
in consumer prices was only moderate. In 1950, the central office for war economics
(Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r Kriegswirtschaft) reported overall success: due to
the interventions, consumer prices adjusted much slower in the period 1939–1946
than in 1914–1921, when there was no intervention (Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r
Kriegswirtschaft, 1950, p. 898).
Table 2: Decomposition of Swiss Money Supply, 1922–1936
Year M1 M1
BASE
BASE
RES
RES
GOLD
PGOLD QGOLD RES
BASE
1922 2395 2.10 1.60 1.12 3.44 186.00 0.62
1923 2327 2.14 1.50 1.15 3.44 182.76 0.66
1924 2285 2.21 1.31 1.33 3.44 172.63 0.76
1925 2411 2.41 1.29 1.40 3.44 161.95 0.78
1926 2538 2.51 1.32 1.41 3.44 158.51 0.76
1927 2652 2.48 1.38 1.34 3.44 168.79 0.73
1928 2792 2.43 1.37 1.45 3.44 168.48 0.73
1929 3122 2.60 1.22 1.59 3.44 180.04 0.82
1930 3232 2.48 1.22 1.50 3.44 207.51 0.82
1931 4006 1.56 1.05 1.05 3.44 683.12 0.95
1932 4066 1.53 1.04 1.04 3.44 719.30 0.97
1933 3675 1.68 1.09 1.01 3.44 581.59 0.92
1934 3439 1.67 1.08 1.00 3.44 555.89 0.93
1935 3136 1.79 1.25 1.01 3.44 404.24 0.80
1936 3934 1.41 1.01 1.02 3.44 788.52 0.99
Notes: M1, the monetary base (BASE), the gold reserves (GOLD), and the total reserves (RES)
are measured in millions of Swiss francs. The gold parity (PGOLD) corresponds to the price of
one gram of gold in Swiss francs. QGOLD denotes the quantity of gold reserves in tons.
Source: Swiss National Bank
www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz gm/source (T1.3 and T2.2)
www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz snb/source (T1.1)
www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/histz snb book/source (page 31)
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Figure 5: Decomposition of Swiss Money Supply, 1922–1936
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Lastly, as stated in the introduction, we do not include a gold standard mecha-
nism. To motivate our choice of model, we follow Bernanke (1995) and decompose
Swiss money supply (M1) in the period 1922–1936 into contributions of the money
multiplier (M1/BASE, BASE: monetary base), the inverse of the gold backing ra-
tio (BASE/RES; RES: international reserves), the ratio of international reserves
to gold (RES/GOLD), and the gold reserves of the Swiss National Bank, expressed
in domestic currency (GOLD = PGOLD ×QGOLD):
M1 =
M1
BASE
× BASE
RES
× RES
GOLD
× PGOLD ×QGOLD (1)
The results reported in Table 2 and Figure 5 indicate that Switzerland did not
fully commit to the rules of the game of the Gold Standard during the Interwar
Period: the ratio of the monetary base to international reserves (BASE/RES) is
not stable and hence the cover ratio was significantly varying over time. In fact,
it went up from 78% in 1925 to 1 almost 100% in 1931. Consequently, an inflow
of international currency reserves and gold reserves did not fully translate into an
increase of the monetary base proportional to the cover ratio. Therefore, we refrain
from including a particular Gold Standard mechanism into the model as opposed to
e.g. Bordo et al. (2007).
Ultimately, we would like to assess whether an overvalued currency or the world-
wide economic downturn was the main determinant of the long lasting recession
in Switzerland. Consequently, we model both terms of trade and foreign demand
as exogenous structural shocks. Using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
approach allows to measure over–/undervaluation of the Swiss franc and to conduct
counterfactual analysis in a straightforward way. Furthermore, we study the role
of price rigidities and its importance during the Interwar Period in Switzerland.
Therefore, we allow for monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. The home
economy is infinitesimal small and does not affect the economy of the rest of the
world, and markets are assumed to be complete, i.e. agents trade a full set of state
contingent bonds. In every period, economic agents form rational expectations, the
representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility, and firms maximize
12
Figure 6: Model Overview
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expected profits. A sketch of the model and presented in Figure 6, while more de-
tailed description of the model, which corresponds to a basic New Open Economy
Model, is presented below.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by an infinitely lived representative household who seeks
to maximize
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt)
]
with U(Ct, Nt) =
(
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
by optimally choosing consumption Ct and labor input Nt. Its period t budget
constraint looks as follows:
PtCt +QtBt+1 = WtNt +Bt, (2)
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where Qt denotes the price of a one–period discount bond paying off one unit of
domestic currency at time t + 1, Et [Qt,t+1] ≡ Qt = 1Rt . Pt, Bt, Wt, σ, η, and
β denote the consumer price index, bond holdings, the nominal wage, the inverse
of the elasticity of substitution, the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply,
and the discount factor respectively. Moreover, we impose a standard no–Ponzi
condition, lim
j→∞
Et
[
Bt+τ∏τ
j=0Rt+j
]
= 0, which implies that the period budget constraint
always holds with equality. Ct denotes a consumption composite index, i.e.
Ct =
(
(1− γ) 1a (Cht )a−1a + γ 1a (Cft )a−1a ) aa−1 , (3)
where Cft refers to one single foreign good, C
h
t ≡
(∫ 1
0
(
Cht,j
) θ
θ−1 dj
) θ
θ−1
corresponds
to a Dixit–Stiglitz Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregate of domestic
goods, and Cht,j a domestic variety j. The exact composition C
h
t and C
f
t is optimally
chosen by the households according to the demand functions
Cht =
(
P ht
Pt
)−a
Ct(1− γ) ; Cft =
(
P ft
Pt
)−a
Ctγ. (4)
Moreover, P ft captures the foreign price of the foreign produced good, the preference
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a measure of home bias8, a > 0 governs the substi-
tutability between domestic and foreign goods, and θ > 0 denotes the elasticity
of substitution between domestic varieties. The household’s utility maximization
problem at period t can be summarized as
max
{Cτ ,Nτ ,Bτ+1}
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
C1−στ
1− σ −
N1+ητ
1 + η
)]
s.t. PτCτ +QτBτ+1 ≤ WτNτ +Bτ ,
(5)
yielding the following two standard optimality conditions:
Nηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
; (6)
8Since it is equal to the import share, it can also be interpreted as a natural measure of openness
(Gal´ı, 2008).
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Et [Qt,t+1] = Qt = βEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)]
. (7)
Equation (6) captures optimal static labor supply decision, i.e. marginal rate of
substitution between labor and leisure is equal to the real wage rate, while the
inter–temporal Euler equation is represented by equation (7).
2.2 Firms
Firm j produces output Yt,j using the production technology
Yt,j = Nt,j, (8)
with labor as the only input factor. Profits are maximized by minimizing costs for
a given amount of output, i.e.
min
{Nt,j}
Wt
P ht
Nt,j, s.t. Yt,j = Nt,j. (9)
The resulting first order condition contains the real marginal costs of production,
which is denoted by Ψt. Since marginal costs are constant, Ψt is also equal to the
real average cost or real unit cost of production:
Wt
P ht
−Ψt = 0⇔ Ψt = Wt
P ht
= W rt . (10)
In equilibrium, goods market clearing implies
Yt = C
h
t + C
h?
t , (11)
which implies that aggregate output Yt is fully absorbed by domestic consumption of
the domestically produced good Cht and foreign consumption of the domestic good
Ch
?
t . This leads to the demand functions for variety j,
Cht,j + C
h?
t,j =
(
P ht,j
P ht
)−θ
Yt. (12)
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P ht,j denotes the price of domestic variety j, and P
h
t corresponds to the price index
of domestic goods.
Prices are sticky in the sense that with a probability ω firms are not allowed to
optimally update their price at the beginning of the period. As stated above, price
stickiness is an important stylized fact for the period under analysis: a large share
of domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. The pricing mechanism
used here goes back to Calvo (1983). P¯ ht,j denotes the price set by firm j in period
t, which implies P (P ht+τ,j = P¯
h
t,j) = ω
τ . Moreover, since all firms are identical and
face identical demand curves, P¯ ht,j = P¯
h
t .
Therefore, period t profit of firm j, conditional on being allowed to reset its price
is
pit,j =
(
P¯ ht − P ht Ψt
)
(Cht,j + C
h?
t,j ) =
(
P¯ ht − P ht Ψt
)( P¯ ht
P ht
)−θ
Yt, (13)
where P ht Ψt corresponds to the nominal unit costs. Conditional on being allowed to
reset its price level, firm j maximizes the expected current market value of profits
while the price remains effective. In particular,
max
{P¯ht }
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
ωτQt,t+τ
(
P¯ ht − P ht+τΨt+τ
)( P¯ ht
P ht+τ
)−θ
Yt+τ
]
, (14)
where Qt,t+τ = β
τ Λt+τ
Λt
denotes the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs.
The first order condition with respect to P¯ ht is
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
ωτQt,t+τ
Λt+τ
Λt
Yt+τ
(
(1− θ)
(
P¯ ht
P ht+τ
)−θ
+ θ
(
P¯ ht
P ht+τ
)−θ−1
Ψt+τ
)]
= 0. (15)
2.3 Global Characteristics
2.3.1 Exchange Rate & Terms of Trade
We assume that the law of one price holds, i.e.
P ft = StP
?
t , (16)
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where P ?t , P
f
t , St denote the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted in
foreign currency, the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted in domestic
currency, and the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the price of foreign currency
in terms of domestic currency respectively. The real exchange rate is
Φt =
P ft
Pt
=
StP
?
t
Pt
, (17)
and corresponds to the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic consumption
bundles, while the terms of trade, the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic
goods, is defined as
∆t =
P ft
P ht
=
StP
?
t
P ht
, (18)
and follows an exogenous9 and stationary first–order autoregressive (AR(1)) process
in logs,
ln(∆t) = ρδ ln(∆t−1) + δt , 
δ
t ∼ N(0, σ2δ ), (19)
where ρδ < 1 characterizes the persistence parameter and σ
2
δ the variance of the
shock δt .
2.3.2 Foreign Country
The domestic economy is an infinitesimal small open economy whereas the foreign
economy can be thought of as an aggregate of infinitely many identical infinitesi-
mal small open economies. Therefore, in the aggregate, net exports of all foreign
economies will sum up to zero, which implies C?t = Y
?
t . Foreign consumption C
?
t
is equal to foreign demand Y ?t , which follows an exogenous and stationary AR(1)
process in logs,
ln(Y ?t ) = (1− ρ?) ln(Y ?) + ρ? ln(Y ?t−1) + ?t , ?t ∼ N(0, σ2y?), (20)
with a persistence parameter ρ? smaller than one and a variance σ
2
y? of the shock 
?
t .
9We are aware of the fact that this specification is not fully consistent with the underlying
model, because prices are endogenously determined. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) point out that
an estimation of the full structural model including endogenous terms of trade turned out to be
too restrictive and therefore lead to implausible estimates. Consequently, we decided to to follow
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) by treating the terms of trade as an exogenous process.
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2.3.3 International Trade
Exports are denoted in domestic goods and given by
EXt = C
h?
t . (21)
For imports (denoted in domestic goods), we have
IMt =
P ft
P ht
Cft (22)
Net exports (denoted in domestic goods) are the difference between exports and
imports,
NXt = EXt − IMt. (23)
2.3.4 International Risk Sharing
International risk sharing under complete markets implies that the stochastic dis-
count factor among different countries is equal to (Chari et al., 2002)
Qt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
= β
(
C?t+1
C?t
)−σ
StP
?
t
St+1P ?t+1
, (24)
where P ?t denotes the foreign consumer price index, and which implies the following
international risk sharing condition:10
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
= Φt. (25)
As a result, complete markets lead to this this simple relationship linking the real
exchange rate to the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption of domestic and
foreign households.
10
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
=
(
C?0
C0
)−σ
1
Φ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
Φt = µΦt represents the general form of the risk sharing condition.
Without loss of generality we set the initial condition µ equal to one.
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2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregate Production Function
The firm level production function is represented by
Nt,j = Yt,j. (26)
Labor market clearing implies
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt,jdj, (27)
which enables us to compute the aggregate production function
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Yt,jdj =
∫ 1
0
(
P ht,j
P ht
)−θ (
Cht + C
h?
t
)
dj =
=Yt
∫ 1
0
(
P ht,j
P ht
)−θ
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζt
= Ytζt ⇔
Yt =
Nt
ζt
. (28)
ζt can be seen as a measrure of price dispersion. The full set of optimality conditions
can be found in Appendix A.
3 Data and Estimation Method
For the estimation exercise, we use monthly data of industrial production, inflation,
and net exports, ranging from January 1926 to December 1938. An official industrial
production index is not available before 1965 (Cascioni, 2000, p. 281). Already in the
1930s, this situation was deemed unsatisfactory, at least from the viewpoint of the
Federal Statistical Office.11 The problem of the missing Swiss production index (Das
Problem einer schweizerischen Produktionsstatistik) was discussed at the 1936 meet-
ing of the the Swiss Statistical Society (Schweizerische Statistische Gesellschaft).
11“Ein grosser Teil der schweizerischen Bevo¨lkerung ist auf Gedeih und Verderb auf den Ertrag
der industriellen Anlagen und auf ihre Bescha¨ftigung in ihnen angewiesen. Wie gross ist dieser
Ertrag? Wir kennen ihn nicht.” (Schwarz, 1936, p. 147)
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The overview in the Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft published by the
German statistical office in 1936 (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936) showed that of the
80 countries in the collection, 54 had industrial production statistics, Switzerland
not being among them. To explain the situation, industrial representatives (build-
ing, engineering, textile and printing) listed the general reluctance of the industry
providing the data,12 the high cost of data collection, and the availability of high
quality trade statistics, which sufficed the needs of the mainly export oriented Swiss
industry, therefore making a production index superfluous.13 Because of the lack of
contemporaneous data, we could switch to the sectoral estimates provided by David
(1995), but these series are only at an annual frequency. Therefore, we decided to
use the business cycle indicators published in the period of interest as a proxy, and
take SBB (Swiss Federal Railway) freight data, as well as indicators for silk and
watch production,14 which represent the two most important export industries in
Switzerland in the Interwar Period.15
Inflation data is calculated based on the consumer price index taken from the
Federal Statistical Office.16 Based on household accounts from 1912, 1920, and 1921
for skilled laborers, unskilled laborers and employees, the index was first published
in January 1922 by the Federal Office of Labour (Eidgeno¨ssisches Arbeitsamt), first
only for food. Because of critique by employee organizations and trade unions, it
was extended to other expenditure groups and, after the revision in 1926, consisted
of food, fuel (soap), clothing and rent.17
As already mentioned, there are high quality trade statistics available for Switzer-
land, both by volume and value, at monthly frequency.18 The Federal Customs Of-
12“Dann muss die Verbandsleitung auch mit einer Abneigung der Mitglieder rechnen, Dinge
bekanntzugeben, welche die Grundlagen des Gescha¨fts betreffen. Diese Einstellung wa¨re besonders
seitens der welschen Mitglieder zu gegenwa¨rtigen, welche sich schon heute u¨ber einen angeblich
u¨berwuchernden ‘esprit de police’ der Verba¨nde beklagen.” (Marti, 1936, p. 176)
13See the contributions by Cattani (1936), Bu¨hler-Krayer (1936), Fischer (1936), and Marti
(1936).
14Source: SNB monthly reports (1926–1929, 1936–1938) and Die Volkswirtschaft (1930–1936).
15See Figure B.1 in Appendix B for a time series of of the export shares of the two industries.
16Landesindex fu¨r Konsumentenpreise, www.statistik.admin.ch (cc-d-05.02.17.xls).
17See Gordon (1939) and Koch (2000) for an overview. The index prior to 1926 is described in
detail in Eidgeno¨ssisches Arbeitsamt (1923), the revised index in Bundesamt fu¨r Industrie, Gewerbe
und Arbeit (1935).
18See Acklin (1939) and Balmer and Zurwerra (2000) for an overview.
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fice (Eidgeno¨ssische Oberzolldirektion) publishes these data since 1885. We use the
Monatsstatistik des auswa¨rtigen Handels der Schweiz, 1926–1938.19
The solution of the model described in Section 2 leads to a non–linear system
of expectational first–order difference equations, which we log–linearize around its
deterministic steady state, before solving it using the method proposed by Klein
(2000). The solution of the model provides the policy functions, which can be
written in state space form as
xt =Zαt;
αt =Tαt−1 + Rνt, νt ∼ N(0,Q),
(29)
where xt is a 3 × 1 vector of observables (output, inflation, and net exports), and
αt is the 2 × 1 unobservable state vector driven by the two structural shocks in
νt with variance Q. The model is of course a highly stylized representation of the
Swiss economy in the 1930s. Therefore, we follow Ireland (2004) and incorporate a
dynamic measurement error with a vector autoregressive (VAR) structure into the
state vector to allow for off–model dynamics in the data:
κt = Aκt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ). (30)
The structure of the extended state space model is therefore
xt =
(
Z I3
)αt
κt
 ;
αt
κt
 =
T 0
0 A
αt−1
κt−1
+
R 0
0 I3
νt
t
 .
(29′)
The setup allows to estimate the structural parameters of the model using Max-
imum Likelihood or Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We
choose the Bayesian approach, since in this framework, it is straightforward to im-
pose parameter restrictions using the prior distribution. The restrictions are neces-
sary because there is no guarantee that the estimation algorithm results in parameter
19All data are available on request.
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estimates which make sense from an economic point of view. If this turns out to
be too restrictive, the measurement error variance will dominate the variance of the
structural model.
Lastly, we calibrate two structural parameters prior to the estimation exercise. In
particular, we set the subjective discount factor β equal to the conventional value of
0.99 and the preference parameter γ equal to the import share of the Swiss economy
during the period of investigation.
We impose uniform priors with reasonable ranges for the structural parameters
to be as loose as possible (see Table 3).20 To generate the parameter chain, we
use the tailored randomized MCMC method proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010). The procedure is a modification of the standard Metropolis–Hastings algo-
rithm (e.g. Chib and Greenberg, 1995). In each simulation step, the parameters are
randomly combined into blocks. A proposal draw is generated from a multivariate
t–distribution with a scale matrix derived at the conditional maximum of the poste-
rior. The proposal is accepted if the value of the posterior at the new parameters is
higher than for the old parameters. If not, it is accepted with an acceptance prob-
ability drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1), to ensure that we find a global
maximum.
Since our estimation approach requires stationary data, we detrend our time
series prior to estimation. Furthermore, in all our time series we observe a strong
seasonal pattern. Therefore, we also deseasonalize the time series before the esti-
mation. In particular, for output we use the cyclical component of a quadratically
detrended and X–1221 deseasonalized time series. For net exports we use a demeaned
and X–12 seasonally adjusted time series, while for inflation we use monthly growth
rates of year–to–year differences of the consumer price index. Data plots of the time
series used for estimation can be found in Appendix B.
20For the VAR–component, we require that the maximum absolute eigenvalue of A is less than
0.6 to ensure that the persistence in the model comes from the structural shocks. In addition, the
matrix Σ has to be positive semidefinite, and the maximum measurement error variance is not
allowed to take values of more than 60 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable
time series. This is similar to Garc´ıa-Cicco et al. (2010), who restrict the measurement error
variance “to absorb no more than 6 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable time
series” (p. 2519). Since the vectorized variance covariance matrix of the VAR part is given by
vec (Σκ) = (I32 −A⊗A) vec (Σ), our choice is not overly restrictive.
21Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA procedure
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4 Results
This section presents the results and findings of our estimation exercise. Unless
otherwise mentioned, we focus on the results using SBB freight data as a proxy
for output. However, occasionally we also complement our findings with result sets
using silk or watch production instead of freight data.
4.1 Parameter Distributions
With the algorithm described in the previous section, we draw 400,000 replications,
discarding the first 150,000 as burn–in. Geweke’s χ2–test (4% taper) is used to
assess convergence of the parameter chains (Geweke, 1992). Results of the posterior
distribution of the structural parameters22 are presented in Table 3 and show a
presence of high persistence in foreign demand, terms of trade, and prices. This
finding underlines the fact that price rigidities seem to be an important feature of
the Swiss economy at this time.
Table 3: Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Dist. Median 90% Bands Gewekes χ2
β calibrated 0.99 - -
γ calibrated 0.25 - -
θ U ∼ [5,7] 6.425 [5.312,6.946] 0.358
η U ∼ [1.5,3] 2.660 [1.861,2.967] 0.875
σ U ∼ [1.5,3] 2.705 [2.026,2.969] 0.835
a U ∼ [3,6] 3.097 [3.009,3.373] 0.337
ω U ∼ [0.4,1] 0.995 [0.993,0.996] 0.878
ρy? U ∼ [0,1] 0.989 [0.983,0.993] 0.355
ρδ U ∼ [0,1] 0.999 [0.997,1.000] 0.189
σy? U ∼ [0.01,0.03] 0.020 [0.014,0.029] 0.615
σδ U ∼ [0.01,0.03] 0.010 [0.010,0.010] 0.371
Notes: Results are based on 400,000 draws, where the first 150,000 are discarded as burn–in
draws. SBB freight data is used for industrial production.
22Posterior distribution of measurement error components can be found in Appendix C.
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4.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The decomposition of the forecast error variance, presented in Figure 7 of output
and inflation shows that the structural model, even though being quite stylized,
contributes a significant part to the dynamics in the data, especially in the long run.
Thus, we conclude that the choice of the model, though being quite stylized, turned
out to be appropriate and well–suited for explaining macroeconomic fluctuations of
the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period.
Figure 7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (SBB)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, SBB freight data is
used for industrial production.
Furthermore, the structural model is more important for inflation than for output
– this demonstrates again that price rigidity is an important feature of the Swiss
economy in this period. Inflation is mainly driven by movements in terms of trade
both in the short and in the long run. Off–model dynamics are more important
for output, which indicates that the model is not able to capture all the dynamics
of this eventful period, especially in the short run. However, the structural part
of the model becomes more and more important at longer horizons so that in the
long run the measurement error only accounts for about 10 percent of the variation
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Figure 8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Silk)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, silk production is
used for industrial production.
Figure 9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Watches)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, watch production is
used for industrial production.
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in output. Regarding the two structural shocks, foreign demand is slightly more
important than terms of trade in the the short run, which in turn becomes more
important in the long run.
Figures 8 and 9 report the relative importance of the shocks in case we use
silk or watch production as a proxy for output instead of SBB freight data. While
the results reveal a worse model fit in general for these two specifications, we find
qualitatively similar results for the forecast error variance decomposition. Hence,
the importance of terms of trade turns out to be a robust finding.
4.3 Price Rigidities
Figure 10: Average duration of prices ( 1
1−ω )
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Notes: Average duration in months implies by the estimated posterior distributions.
Another robust finding is the presence of severe price rigidities. Figure 10 depicts
the distribution of the average duration of a price being effective implied by the
estimated posterior distributions of ω. It reveals that independent of the choice
of the output time series ω seemed to be rather high, which translates into a high
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degree of price stickiness. The remarkably high duration of prices being effective
of the watches model is in line with an observed high degree of cartelization of the
export sector as described in Section 2.
4.4 Estimated States
The fact that terms of trade and foreign demand are modeled as exogenous processes
allows us to extract the model implied time series. The smoothed states displayed
in Figure 11 are based on on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution and using
the Kalman filter to generate the time series. The foreign demand state shows
the pattern of the business cycle for the main trading partners of Switzerland:23 a
downturn starting mid 1928, the lower turning point in 1932/33, and the recession
1936/37. This development should have helped Switzerland to escape earlier from
the Great Depression. However, the terms of trade state shows that the Swiss franc
stayed overvalued until autumn 1936. The sharp amelioration of the terms of trade
time series almost perfectly coincides with the devaluation of the Swiss franc on
September 26 in 1936. This finding is even more remarkable, since we did not include
any data on exchange rates or terms of trade in the estimation exercise. A sharp
decline after the outbreak of the Great Depression in 1929 can be observed, and the
terms of trade did not reach equilibrium until the devaluation of the Swiss franc
in September 1936. The forecast error variance decomposition of output reveals
that terms of trade are more important than foreign demand. Consequently, the
positive effect of increasing foreign demand after 1932/33 was overcompensated by
the overvaluation of the Swiss franc, and the escape from the Great Depression did
not start before September 1936.
23See Table 1 for the import and export shares of the main trading partners in this period.
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Figure 11: Estimated Exogenous States
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands, black
line represents median.
4.5 Counterfactual Experiments
4.5.1 Leaving Gold in 1931/33
What would have been the consequence of Switzerland leaving the Gold Standard
together with Britain on September 21, 1931? What would have happened in case
Switzerland did not participate in the Gold Block in July 1933 but devaluated their
currency instead? To address the issue, we simulate the case of an early devaluation
by setting the terms of trade state equal to one (i.e. the terms of trade are in
equilibrium) and use 5,000 draws from the posterior parameter distribution and the
Kalman filter to generate the counterfactual time series of interest. We calculate the
differences between the predicted log deviations of output from the actual deviations,
which is equal to percent differences in levels. As can be seen from Figure 12, this
difference turns out to be always positive after 1932. This is in line with our previous
interpretation: obviously, the overvaluation of the Swiss franc against the sterling
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bloc and the US dollar caused the Swiss exporting sectors to profit less from the
increasing demand after 1932/33 than small European countries with a devalued
currency such as the Scandinavian countries. At least, there was some growth: in
real terms, exports increased by 16% between 1932 and 1934. But in 1935, when
sterling further weakened, the upward trend of exports decelerated.
Figure 12: Estimated Gain of Leaving Gold in September 1931 / July 1933
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands, black
line represents median.
4.5.2 Alleviating Price Rigidities
What would have been the implications for the Swiss economy of a lower degree of
price stickiness? Would a policy intervention decreasing the degree of cartelization
have been beneficial? We draw 5,000 times from the posterior distribution and set ω
equal to a lower counterfactual value. As a consequence, firms are in this experiment
allowed to reset their price level more frequently. We analyze two different scenarios:
(i) strong intervention (small ω): the average duration of prices being effective
reduces from 182 to 50 months, and (ii) medium intervention (medium ω): the
average duration of prices being effective reduces from 182 to 100 months. As a
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next step, we estimate the counterfactual level of output implied by the structural
part of the model by generating counterfactual data. Figure 13 depicts the results
and emphasizes the potential benefits of policies that reduce price rigidities. In
particular, the extent to which the economy is exposed to cyclical fluctuations is
significantly reduced with a lower ω. Hence, the severity of the Great Depression
might have been amplified by the rise of corporatist policies.
Figure 13: Counterfactual Price Rigidities
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are
reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while
medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months.
5 Conlusion
As Choudhri and Kochin (1980) show, countries staying on gold, such as Nether-
lands, Belgium, Italy or Poland, faced a much more severe depression than the
Scandinavian countries or Spain, which never returned to gold. The Gold Bloc
countries stayed depressed, while the countries leaving gold early recovered by 1935
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Campa, 1990; Bernanke and James, 1991; Eichen-
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green, 1992). The main determinants for the timing of abandoning the gold parity
were deflationary pressure, the existence of banking crises, the gold cover ratio, and
the extent of trade integration (Wolf, 2007, 2008).
The decision of Britain to abandon the gold standard on September 21, 1931
was seen as a catastrophe by contemporary Swiss policy makers.24 Because of the
fear of inflationary pressure caused by a floating exchange rate and the fact that the
accumulated gold stock was big enough to avert speculative attacks, Switzerland
managed to stay on gold until September 26, 1936.
What were the consequences of this policy for the Swiss economy? In a New
Keynesian small open economy framework, we show that foreign demand deviations
from equilibrium started to increase in the second half of 1931. This should have
had a positive effect on Swiss output. However, at the same time, the terms of trade
deteriorated. Since the contribution of the terms of trade shock to the forecast
error variance of output was higher than the contribution of foreign demand, the
second effect dominated, and it took the Swiss economy until autumn 1936 to start
recovering from the Great Depression.
Finally, we detect a severe degree of price rigidity of the Swiss economy dur-
ing the Interwar Period, which impeded an internal adjustment and therefore also
contributed to a prolonged recession.
24An example is the evaluation of this step as “disastrous” in the 25th Anniversary Festschrift of
the Swiss National Bank published in 1932: “Am 21. September 1931 gab das durch große Gold-
abzu¨ge bedra¨ngte und dadurch in seinen Reserven bedrohte England die Goldwa¨hrung auf. Dieser
Schritt war um so verha¨ngnisvoller, als zahlreiche Staaten dem Beispiel Englands unmittelbar fol-
gten” (Schweizerische Nationalbank, 1932, p. 301/302).
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Appendix A Optimality Conditions
.
• Consumption Composite Index:
Ct =
(
(1− γ) 1a (Cht )a−1a + γ 1a (Cft )a−1a ) aa−1 (A.1)
• Consumer Price Index:
Pt =
(
(1− γ) (P ht )1−a + γ (P ft )1−a) 11−a (A.2)
• Demand Functions:
Cht =
(
P ht
Pt
)−a
Ct(1− γ) (A.3)
Cft =
(
P ft
Pt
)−a
Ctγ (A.4)
• Intratemporal Labor Leisure Trade–off:
Nηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
(A.5)
• Terms of Trade:
∆t =
P ft
P ht
(A.6)
• Real Exchange Rate:
Φt =
P ft
Pt
(A.7)
• Real Marginal (average) Cost of Production:
Ψt =
Wt
P ht
(A.8)
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• Aggregate Production Function:
Yt =
Nt
ζt
(A.9)
• Calvo Pricing:
A1,t =YtΨt + ωβEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)
−1(Πht+1)
θ+1A1,t+1
]
(A.10)
A2,t =Yt + ωβEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)
−1(Πht+1)
θA2,t+1
]
(A.11)
• Domestic Inflation:
1 =
(
(1− ω)
(
θA1,t
(θ − 1)A2,t
)1−θ
+ ω
(
Πht
)θ−1) 11−θ
(A.12)
• Exports:
EXt = C
h?
t = γ∆
a
tY
?
t (A.13)
• Imports:
IMt = ∆t
(
P ft
Pt
)−a
γCt (A.14)
• Inflation Rate of Domestic Goods
Πht+1 =
P ht+1
P ht
(A.15)
• Domestic Inflation Rate
Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
(A.16)
• National Accounting Identity:
Yt = C
h
t + C
h?
t (A.17)
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• International Risk Sharing Condition:
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
= Φt (A.18)
• Foreign Demand (Exogenous Process):
ln(Y ?t ) = (1− ρ?) ln(Y ?) + ρ? ln(Y ?t−1) + ?,t, with ?t ∼ N(0, σ2?) (A.19)
• Terms of Trade (Exogenous Process):
ln(∆t) = ρ
δ ln(∆t−1) + δt , with 
δ
t ∼ N(0, σ2δ ) (A.20)
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Appendix B Supplementary Plots
Figure B.1: Export Shares
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Figure B.2: Data (Output SBB Freight)
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Figure B.3: Data (Output Watch Production)
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Notes: For details and sources see Section 3.
Figure B.4: Data (Output Silk Production)
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Appendix C Additional Estimation Results
Figure C.1: Counterfactual Price Rigidities
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are
reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while
medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months.
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Table C.1: Posterior Distributions of Non–Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Dist. Median 90% Bands Gewekes χ2
a11 stationary 0.918 [0.745,1.082] 0.948
a21 stationary -0.774 [-1.040,-0.550] 0.693
a31 stationary -0.011 [-0.017,-0.006] 0.322
a12 stationary 0.257 [0.126,0.379] 0.431
a22 stationary -0.017 [-0.200,0.172] 0.358
a23 stationary 0.001 [-0.004,0.006] 0.588
a13 stationary 0.000 [-0.068,0.019] 0.451
a23 stationary 0.001 [-0.090,0.352] 0.515
a33 stationary 0.000 [-0.001,0.004] 0.581√
VAR(κy) positive definite 0.050 [0.045,0.056] 0.282√
VAR(κnx) positive definite 0.067 [0.060,0.074] 0.349√
VAR(κpi) positive definite 0.001 [0.000,0.001] 0.457
COV(κy, κnx) positive definite -0.001 [-0.002,-0.001] 0.700
COV(κy, κpi) positive definite 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 0.446
COV(κnx, κpi) positive definite 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 0.564
Notes: The VAR matrix is restricted to have a maximum absolute eigenvalue of 0.6
and its entries are only allowed to take on absolute values smaller or equal to 2. The
variance–covariance matrix of the measurement error is restricted to be positive definite
and its entries on the main diagonal are only allowed to take on values, which are not
larger than 60 percent of the variance of the corresponding data series. Results are based
on 400,000 draws, where the first 150,000 are discarded as burn–in draws. SBB freight
data is used for industrial production.
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